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OVERVIEW OF CASE 
This is an action to recover money alleged to be owed 
Respondent for his feed and feeding of Appellant's cattle. 
The parties agreed to 1 compensate Respondent so much money per 
pound increase or gain on Appellant's cattle. The weight of 
the cattle on delivery being a key issue. 
Appellant contends that he was never served a Summons 
~ . 
and Complaint according to the rules of civil procedure and, 
therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter a 
default judgment. Appellant also contends that he was mislead 
by representations made to him by Respondent's attorney and 
that Appellant understood that no legal action would be filed 
i.e., a default judgment, until weigh tickets were obtained; 
that the parties would settle it out of court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant appeals to this court from an Order denying 
Appellant's Motion to Vacate or Set Aside a Default Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
i 
Appellant seeks to have the lower court's Order overturned 
and the default judgment set aside on the grounds that: (1) the 
lower court never obtained jurisdiction over the Appellant and 
(2) Appellant's inadvertance in not filing an Answer was 
because he was mislead by Respondent's attorney's represent-
ations that he would not be defaulted. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 7th day of November, 1978, a deputy 
sheriff from Davis County Sheriff's Office went to the home 
of Appellant, Douglas K. Freeland, at 445 East 450 North, 
Layton, Utah, to serve Appellant a Summons and Complaint in 
an action that had been filed in Millard County District 
Court by Respondent. A friend of the Appellant, Edward 
Oberg, who happened to be at Appellant's home when the sheriff 
came, answered the door. The deputy sheriff inquired of Mr. 
Oberg whether or not he was Appellant. Mr. Oberg informed 
the- process server that he was not the party he sought and 
suggested that the officer return later. The deputy asked Mr. 
Oberg whether he lived at the home of the Appellant, to which 
he responded that he did not live there, but was a friend of 
the Appellant. The deputy gave Mr. Oberg the papers and 
asked him to give them to the Appellant. 
The next day, when Appellant returned from a business 
trip, in Idaho, Appellant found some papers stuck in his 
screen door. Within a day or two thereafter, Appellant called 
Respondent's attorney, Eldon A. Eliason, since his name 
appeared on the Complaint. 
Appellant and Respondent's attorney discussed the alle-
gations set forth in the Complaint. Respondent's attorney 
informed Appellant that he had been in the cattle business 
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for a number of years and that Respondent's Complaints were 
not strong ones; that the weight gain on the cattle was not 
what one would expect, and that the dollar amount his client, 
the Respondent, would be en~itled to, if any, could be best 
determined by obtaining certain weight tickets which would 
show the weight of the cattle at the time Respondent took 
possession of them. 
Appellant informed Respondent's attorney that if Respon-
dent did not have the weight tickets in his possession he 
would obtain them himself from the trucker who trucked the 
cattle for Appellant. 
Appellant understood from the telephone conversation 
that Respondent's attorney agreed not to pursue any further 
legal action until the weight tickets could be obtained by 
Appellant. It was further agreed that the parties were to 
have gotten together to settle this issue since with the 
weight tickets, the weight of the cattle delivered to Respon-
dent would be known with a certainty and if there was any 
amount of money due and owing Respondent, Appellant agreed he 
would pay it. It was Appellant's understanding from the 
telephone conversation with Respondent's attorney that no 
further legal action would be taken against him until the 
weight tickets could be obtained. Respondent's attorney did 
not tell Appellant to file an Answer or obtain legal 
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counsel at any time during the conversation. 
Several weeks later, around the 3rd or 4th week of Nov-
ember, 1978, Appellant contacted the truck driver who 
informed him that he had the weight tickets and would mail 
them to Appellant.. Appellant waited for approximately a 
month and then contacted the trucker several additional times, 
with three to four weeks lapsing between contacts and being 
informed each time, that_the trucker had the weight tickets 
and would send them right away to the Appellant. 
Appellant proceeded under the assumption that nothing 
further would be done until the weight tickets were obtainedc 
No additional contact was made between the parties until 
Respondent's attorney filed a default judgment, for Appellant's 
failure to file an Answer to Respondent's Complaint, on April 
11, 1979. 
Appellant contacted Respondent's attorney after receiving 
an undated letter informing him that default judgment had 
been entered against him on the 11th day of April, 1979, in 
the amount of $5,879.46. Appellant contacted Respondent's 
attorney upon receipt of the letter and inquired as to why he 
had entered judgment against him, since he had agreed not: to 
do anything further. Respondent's attorney informed him that 
his client had pressured him to enter the default. 
Appellant contacted Scott W. Holt, Attorney for Appellant, 
shortly thereafter and Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate 
Judgment upon the grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction 
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over the Appellant in that he had not been served according 
to Rule 4{e) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that 
Appellant had been mislead as to what actions he should have 
taken by Respondent's attorney's statements and the agree-
ments, that no further action would be taken by Respondent 
until Respondent had obtained the weight tickets. 
The Motion to Vacate was argued on the 17th day of July, 
1979, and briefs were submitted on the issue of jurisdiction. 
Appellant's Motion was denied on the 18th day of December, 
1979 .· Wherefore Appellant respectfully appeals to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Appellant believes that the sole issues before this Court 
are as follows: 
1. Whether or not the lower court obtained jurisdiction 
over the Appellant. 
2. Whether the lower court erred in not granting 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment after 
Appellant demonstrated that there was reasonable justifi-
cation and excuse for his failure to file an answer. 
Appellant's argument is outlined as follows: 
Issue I: The District Court failed to obtain jurisdic-
tion over. the Appellant in that the Appellant was not served 
with a Summons and Complaint in accordance with the proce-
dure as is set forth in Rule 4(e) (1) Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure. 
Point 1: In order to obtain jurisdiction over 
Defendant the service of process must be made upon 
a suitable person who is living at Defendant's usual 
place of abode. 
Point 2: Strict compliance of the statute is required 
when service is made in a manner other than by person-
al service. 
Point 3: Actual notice is.no cure for defective 
service of process where the statute allowing process 
has not been complied with. 
Point 4: The burden of proof shifts to the Plaintiff 
once the Defendant has established the service of 
process to be defective. 
Issue II: The trial court erred in refusing to vacate 
a default judgment entered against the Appellant where the 
Appellant demonstrated that there was a reasonable justifi-
cation and excuse for his failure to file an·Answer. 
Point 1: Appellant was mislead into not filing an 
Answer to Respondent's Complaint by statements made 
to him by Respondent's attorney. 
Point 2: It is an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
vacate a default judgment where reasonable justifi-
cation exists. 
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Point 3: Appellant's motion under Rule 60(b) (1), 
·utah Rules 6f Civil Proc~dure was timely made. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER 
THE APPELLANT I~ THAT TH~ APPELLANT WAS NOT SERVED 
WITH A SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
PROCEDURE AS IS SET FORTH IN RULE 4(e) (1) UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
POINT 1: IN ORDER TO OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT THE 
SERVICE OF PROCESS MUST BE MADE UPON A SUITABLE PERSON WHO 
IS .LIVING AT DEFENDANT'S USUAL PLACE OF ABODE. 
Respondent never effected service of process on the 
Appellant in this matter since Appellant was never served 
in accordance to Rule 4 (e) (1) Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Rule (e) (1) requires that the Defendant either be 
served personally or that some person who is residing at 
Defendant's usual place of abode be served in order for jur-
isdiction to be obtained over the Defendant. Rule (e) (1) is 
as follows: 
Personal service within the state shall be as fol-
lows: (1) Upon a natural person of the age of 
14 years or over, by delivering a copy thereof to 
him_ personally, or by leaving such copy at his 
usual place of abode with so~e.person of s~itable 
age and discretion there residing. [Emphasis added] 
It is clear from the facts and record that Defendant 
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was never personally served. It is undisputed that a 
friend of Appellant, a Ed Oberg was served with the papers 
while he was at Appellant's residence. Ed Oberg's sworn 
Affidavit revealed that he was not living or residing at 
Appellant's place of apode. Quoting from Ed Oberg's Sup-
plemental Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss, 
paragraph 3: 
That Affiant was not a resident of 2445 East 450 
North, Layton, Utah, nor living at said residence 
at the time the Summons and Complaint was received 
by him; that I informed the officer of this fact 
at the time I was given said papers, but I was 
instructed to take them anyway. 
The law is as stated in 62 Am Jur 2d 887, and 14 L.Ed 
2d 751 should be controlling on this issue. 62 Am Jur 2d 
887, 888 states: 
That the person with whom the papers are left must 
live within the occupied premises of the Defendant. 
Federal courts have uniformly held accordingly and have 
ruled upon the exact question as is present in the instant 
case. Utah's statute is almost identical to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 14 L.Ed 2d 751 states that: 
There is authority to the effect that where 
a Defendant maintains a household, the words 
"then residing therein" meal'l;, so far as the 
"residing" aspect is concerned, that the 
person with whom the papers are left must live 
within the occupied premises, so that a servant 
for example, who sleeps elsewhere would not be 
a person "residing therein". 
In Zucherman v. McCullay, 7 FRD 739 app. dismd. 1970 F 2d 
1015, the Defendant in that case filed a motion to quash 
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service of process in that a.Summons and Complaint had not 
been left at Defendant's "dwelling house or .usual place 
of abode with some person of a suitable age and discretion 
then residing therein" in conformity with Rule 4 (d) (1) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the hearing, evi-
dence was presented that showed the person served was an 
employee of the Defendant's, a janitor, who worked there 
during1the day, but who lived elsewhere. The District Court 
concluded that the person served was not "residing therein" 
within the meaning of the Rule. The United States Court 
of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling. See also: 
Leo v. Shin Shu, 30 FRD 56 and Judson v. Judson, FRD 366; 
Smith v. Kincaid, 249 F 2d 243, {case distinguishedbecause 
court felt a "nexus" existed where landlady was served}. It 
is clear from the cases cited that a person served must be 
living or residing at Defendant's place of abode at the time 
the person is served in order for jurisdiction to be obtain-
ed over Defendant. Because our statute is nearly identical 
to the one cited in Zucherman, supra., this court should 
also require service on a person living or residing at Defen-
dant's residence in order to have valid service of process. 
This was not done in the instant case and, therefore, this 
Court should rule in favor of the Appellant. 
POINT 2: STRICT COMPLIANCE OF THE STATUTE IS REQUIRED WHEN 
SERVICE IS MADE IN A MANNER OTHER THAN BY PERSONAL SERVICE. 
Utah courts have uniformly held that there must be 
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strict compliance with the statute allowing service of pro-
cess by means other than by serving the Defendant personally. 
Redwood Land Company v. Kimball, 20 UT 2d 113, 433 P 2d 1010 
(1967), Utah Sand and Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 UT 
2d 407, 402 P 2d 703. It may be pointed out that the legis-
lative intent which allows even a substituted form of service 
of process was done with the belief that persons residing 
with the person served would likely be family members of that 
person. In Bank of America National Trust and Savings 
Association v. Carr, 292 P 2d 587, the Court held that even 
though the service of process procedures were substantially 
complied with, that "the statutory conditions on which service 
depends must be strictly observed. Unless the statute has 
been complied with there is no power to render a judgment". 
In the instant case, the said statute was not complied 
with. Our statute requires that substitute service, i.e., 
service other than by personal service, be made on a person 
of a suitable age residing or living with the person on whom 
service is desired, living at that person's usual place of 
abode. It is clear from the record that no one but the 
Appellant lived or resided at 445 East 450 North, Layton, Utah. 
Quoting from the transcript of the hearing on this matter at 
page 17 line 24: 
Q. (By Mr. Eliason) What members of your family did 
you have residing with you on November the 3rd, 1978, 
at that address? 
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A. There is no one that resided at that address 
besides myself. 
Q. And who is Ed Obert? (sic) 
A. Ed Obert (sic) is a friend of mine. 
Q. And where did Ed Obert (sic) live on the third 
day of November, -1978? 
A. I assume.he lived in Roy. 
The Court: The 7th is the day. 
And quoting further at line 19 page 18: 
Q. (By Mr. Eliason) Did he. [Ed Oberg] report to 
you about the Sheriff having served a Summons upon him? 
A. He did. 
Skipping to line 26, supra. 
Q. What did he [Ed Oberg] tell you in that regards? 
A. He just told me that the Sheriff brought a 
Summons and wanted him to give it to me. 
There can be no question that the statute allowing sub-
stitute service was not complied with. The issuance and ser-
vice of a Summons is a requirement of acquiring jurisdiction 
over a Defendant. Since the correctness of service is of 
such prime essence to a lawsuit, the procedure by which 
service of process is allowed must be strictly complied with. 
POINT 3: ACTUAL NOTICE IS NO CURE FOR DEFECTIVE SERVICE OF 
PROCESS WHERE THE STATUTE ALLOWING PROCESS HAS NOT BEEN 
COMPLIED WITH. 
Actual notice of a lawsuit does not remedy defective 
service of process. Opposing counsel will argue that Appel-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/ 
11 
lant received the Summons and Complaint. This fact is admit-
ted. However, receiving the papers by any other means than 
is allowed by statute still would not correct a defective 
service. The hearing record is clear how Appellant received 
notice regarding the lawsuit. Quoting from the transcript 
page 3 line 10: 
The Court: What you are saying is that service was 
effective upon one Ed Obert (sic)? 
Mr. Holt: That is correct, your honor. 
Skipping line 16; supra: 
The Court: And that Ed Obert (sic), pursuant to his 
Affidavit, left those pleadings, Summons and Complaint 
with or in the screen door? 
Mr. Holt: That is correct. 
Continuing to line 17 page 8: 
Q. Would you tell the Court and inform the Court 
when you first knew or gained knowledge regarding a 
lawsuit had been commenced against you and the cir-
cumstances surrounding that? 
Continuing to line 28, supra: 
A. (Appellant) I am not sure of the date; I'm sure it 
was that part of the year. 
The Court: All right, next question. 
The Witness: I arrived home late at night, sometime 
probably after 9:00 and I find an envelope that is stuck 
in the back door, and I, of course, opened it and 
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looked inside and it was the Summons ... 
In Utah Sand and ·Gravel Products Corp., at 705, supra, 
the court held that there is no :. other substitute for follow-
ing the procedures required for service of process. 
The requisite formalities of the Summons and the 
manner of service prescribed by law are intended 
to assume the recipient the bona fides of the Court 
process and the importance of his giving serious 
attention thereto. These cannot be supplanted 
by the mere notice by .letter, telephone or any 
other such means. 
Clearly, finding papers stuck in a screen door late at 
night would not constitute service of process. Although 
Appellant received the papers, the manner in which he re-
ceived them would leave much to be desired. Actual notice 
is no cure for a defective service of process, and even 
though he received the papers, no jurisdiction was obtained 
over him and he was under no duty to respond, because the 
service of process was defective. Defective service of pro-
cess is not currible by any means except re-servicing him. 
It would appear then, that since no jurisdiction was obtained 
over the Appellant, that the lower court would have no 
authority to enter a default judgment and Appellant's appeal 
should be granted. 
POINT 4: THE BURDEN OF PROOF SHIFTS TO THE PLAINTIFF ONCE 
THE DEFENDANT HAS ESTABLISHED THE SERVICE OF PROCESS TO BE 
DEFECTiIVE. 
It is logical to believe that once the issue of defec-
tive service of process has been raised and there is suffic-
ient evidence to rebut the correctness of the Affidavit of 
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Return of Service, the burden is upon the Plaintiff to 
establish that the facts as are set forth in said Affidavit 
are correct. 
The only evidence before the district court presented 
by the Respondent was the Affidavit of the Return of Service 
wherein the process server stated that he left the papers 
with "a person of suitable age and discretion and residing 
at the usual place of abode of the said Defendant." Appellant 
testified that no one lived with him; that he dwelt alone 
with no family, etc. Ed Oberg, on his oath, stated that he 
told the officer that he did not live at Appellant's residence, 
but was instructed to take: the papers anyway. There was no 
evidence presented, other than what the pre-printed standard 
Affidavit of Return of Service set forth. 
Appellant met his burden to rebute the validity of the 
return and the burden then shifted to Respondent to establish 
the validity of the return. No evidence was presented to 
substantiate that the person served was "residing at Appel-
lant's place of abode." Appellant believes that Respondent 
failed to meet his burden in that Respondent failed to 
verify the correctness of the Return of Service and that the 
lower Court erred in not granting Appellant's Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment. 
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ISSUE II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO VACATE A DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE APPELLANT WHERE THE 
APPELLANT DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE WAS A REASONABLE 
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE FOR HIS FAILURE TO FILE AN 
ANSWER. 
POINT l: APPELLANT WAS MISLEAD INTO· NOT FILING AN ANSWER 
TO RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT BY STATEMENTS MADE TO HIM BY 
RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY. 
Appellant was mislead as to what actions he should 
take to protect his legal interest in the instant case by 
certain statements and representations made to him by 
Respondent's attorney. Utah law provides a remedy from a 
default judgment where the defaulting party was mislead as 
to what actions he should take to protect himself. Rule 
60 (b) (1) states: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
Court may in the interest of justice, relieve a 
party ... from a final judgment ... for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertance ... or 
excusable neglect. 
Ample authority exists that this mislead party is entitled 
to relief under the said rule. Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 301 
P 2d 426, a California Appeal case stated that there is 
excusable neglect where there are settlement negotiations 
and where there is an oral or implied understanding that no 
default will be taken without notice. 
There can be no doubt that a trial court may find 
excusable neglect or surprise where settlement 
negotiations are being had between counsel, ~nd 
where there is an oral or implied understanding Sponsored by the S.J. Quinn y Law Libr ry. Funding for digitization provided by the Institut  of Museum and Library Services 
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that no default will be taken without notice 
and counsel takes such a default without notice. 
Yarbrough, supra at p.430 (see also Wayburn v. Anderson, 253 
P. 149'; Greenamyer v. Bd. of Lugo E. S. Dist., 2 P 2d 848; 
Beard v. Beard, 107 P 2d 385; Bonfilio v. Granger, 140 
P 2d 861; Greenwell v. Caro 249, P 2d 573 for additional 
authority). It would therefore seem logical to assume where 
the understanding is made between the opposing counsel and 
a Defendant, that even greater latitude would be allowed 
for the lay person to be excused by his inadvertance in 
defending himself. The evidence produced at the hearing to 
set aside the default judgment clearly demonstrated that 
Appellant was mislead into not filing an Answer to Respondent's 
Complaint because he was to obtain weigh tickets and then a 
settlement.would be reached. 
Appellant, in his Affidavit and his testimony reasonably 
demonstrated that Respondent's attorney agreed to forego 
further legal action until Appellant could obtain weight tic-
kets which were in the possession of a third party. The 
tickets which were in the possession of a third party. The 
hearing transcript establishes Appellant's understanding 
of what he had agreed to do. Quoting from line 13 page 9: 
[After Appellant found the papers in his screen door] 
Q. What action did you take on your part? 
A. Either the following day or the day after, I don't 
recall whether I had trouble getting ahold of the 
attorney or not, but I made a call to Mr. Roberts' 
attorney's office and I told the attorney that I was Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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surprised, and that I thought it wasn't a founded 
matter; there was no basis for it, and we talked at 
length about cattle; he indicating to me that he, 
.. 
himself, raised cattle and thought that the issues 
weren't exactly strong and the gain on the cattle 
wasn't exactly what you would expect it to be. 
Q. Who did you talk to? 
A. Mr. Eliason. 
Q. Did he identify himself to you on the phone as 
being Mr. Eliason? 
A. He did. 
Contiriuing to line 2 page 10: 
A .... Well, it come down to the issue of what the _ 
cattle weighed when they were received at Delta. Well, 
I had instructed the truckers that trucked the cattle 
from Skoal Valley to weigh the cattle at Delta. 
Going to line 18 page 10: 
Q. Did he indicate to you at any time that he would 
forego taking a default judgment? 
A. Our conversation was that I would get ahold of the 
trucker, get the weigh tickets, which apparently were 
not picked up by Mr. Roberts and taken by the truckers; 
the discussion was I would get the weigh tickets and 
get together with Mr. Roberts and his attorney and try 
to get this thing worked out. 
Q. Did at any time Mr. Eliason give you a date to 
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which this needed to be accomplished? 
A. No date was set. 
Q. So with your conversation, what was your understarid-
ing, then, as to what Mr. Eliason--
[An objection was raised at this question which was 
overruled.] Continuing to line 9 page 11: 
The Court: I think it is a conclusion he can properly 
draw and testify to. Answer the question. 
The Witness: My understanding was, I was to get ahold 
of the trucking company, obtain the weight tickets and 
set up a meeting with Mr. Eliason and Mr. Roberts to 
resolve the issue. 
Q. At any time did he advise you that you needed to 
obtain counsel or file an Answer to the Complaint? 
A. At no time. 
Going to line 12 page 13: 
Q. Then you proceeded on the assumption that nothing 
further would be done on it [further legal action] with 
regards to the lawsuit until these weigh tickets could 
be obtained by you and that you and Plaintiff's attorney 
would meet together and resolve the issue? 
A. Correct. 
Respondent's attorney verified on direct examination, 
that the conversation took place and testified to substan-
tially the same outline of the conversation. (see lines 9 
through 18 at page 23, lines 3 through 24 at page 24 of the 
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transcript). Respondent's attorney admitted that the weight 
tickets were essential to the case and that the weight 
tickets "would be a fundamental question involved." line 10 
page 24. 
Respondent's attorney also stated and advised the 
Appellant to pursue the obtaining of the weigh tickets in 
order that the parties could reach a settlement in the in-
stant case. Respondent's attorney admitted that Appellant 
should pursue the possibility of settlement, quoting from 
line 12 page 25: 
Q. Did you ever tell him [Appellant] or infer to 
him that you and your client, Mr. Roberts, and he 
should have a meeting to see if this issue [the weigh 
tickets and difference in gains] could be resolved 
after he obtained the weight tickets? 
A. (Respondent's attorney) I don't remember that kind 
of a conversation. I definitely told him that if 
there was any area of settlement of this case that we 
should follow it. But I advised him, I am sure, that 
he should get legal counsel. 
Q. But then you did discuss there an area of settle-
ment that it should be followed with him, then, is 
that correct? 
A. Oh, I suppose that I might have said, "If there's 
any possibility of settlement that you should follow it." 
Although Respondent's attorney could not remember ex-
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actly what was said, the record reveals sufficient evidence 
to establish that a reasonable man discussing a case with the 
opposing attorney could reasonably infer from that conversa-
tion that nothing further would be done until the weigh 
tickets could be obtained. Furthermore, Respondent had 
been advised to pursue the "possibilities of settlement", and 
that after the weigh tickets were obtained, "we'll meet" and 
resolve the issue. It is undisputed that the conversation 
took place after Appellant found the Summons and Complaint. 
A reasonable man could reasonably inf er that no further action 
would be taken. The district court erred in not vacating 
the default judgment since reasonable justification existed 
to show that Appellant was mislead and as to what he should 
do. 
POINT 2: IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO REFUSE TO VACATE 
A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHERE REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION EXISTS. 
It has long been held that it is an abuse of the discre-
tion of a court to refuse to vacate a default judgment where 
a reasonable justification exists as to why the Defendant fail-
ed to file a response to an action. Mayhem v. Standard 
Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P 2d 951; Byland v. Crook, 
6 0 Utah 2 8 5 , 2 8 8 , 2 O 8 P 5 O 4 , 5 O 5 ( 19 2 2 ) . Ru 1 e 6 0 ( b ) ( 1 ) s ta te 
in part that: 
The court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party of his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order or proceedings for the following 
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reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or 
excusable neglect. 
In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Company, 123 Utah 415, 260 P 
2d 741, the court stated at page 743 that where an oral 
promise is made to forego taking a default and the time for 
answering is extended that 
Relief in such instances is granted not because the 
other party was fraudulent but because Complainant 
[the Defendant] was deprived of his chance to 
present his case by the conduct of the party 
whether or not the conduct was consciously wrongful. 
In ~he instant case, the Defendant herein complains 
to the Court that representations were orally made to him by 
the ·Respondent's attorney that no further legal action would 
take place until he obtained certain weigh slips and that 
the parties hereto could meet and settle the matter without 
the need of the lawsuit. 
Applying the rule set forth in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
supra, this Court should have found that Respondent's attorney's 
conduct could have reasonably mislead the Appellant into a 
false sense of security regarding what action would be nece-
ssary to take on his part in order to prese~ve his legal 
rights in this case. The testimony of both the Appellant and 
Respondent's attorney of the conversation that took place 
between them, leaves a little doubt as to what was agreed on 
and that the Appellant could have reasonably been mislead 
as to what he should have done. Respondent's attorney testi-
fied that he could have discussed the possibility of settlement 
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and it was possible. Under the circumstances and purview 
of the topics discussed, that the Appellant was lead into 
a mistaken belief that he would not have to file an Answer 
until the weigh slips were obtained. 
Respondent's attorney's forebearance to file a default 
judgment, (which he could have filed approximately four and 
one-half months earlier), would tend to support Appellant's 
contention that an agreement between them existedo Respon-
dent's attorney, on direct examination testified to the fact 
that Appellant was not instructed to file an answer within 
20 days, contrary to other testimony. Quoting from line 19 
page 26 from the transcript: 
Q. I said, in your conversation you did not tell 
him at any time that you expected him to have the 
answer filed within 20 days as per the summons?. 
A. I don't think :that specific statement was made •... 
Furthermore, on direct examinati6n, Respondent's attorney 
admitted that he felt Appellant had become "dilatory". Why 
would an adverse party believe someone was "dilatory" if 
there was not some understanding that that party was to per-
form something? Respondent's attorney acknowledged the~eby 
that he had indeed been waiting for Respondent to obtain the 
weigh tickets. Quoting from line 11 page 27, Respondent's 
attorney makes this acknowledgement: 
Q. (Appellant's attorney) Is one reason why [waiting 
4~ months before taking default] is because you were 
waiting for him [Appellant] to obtain the weigh tickets, 
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so that you could settle this matter, or the reason 
that you proceeded was because your client pressured 
you to take default? 
A. I had been waiting quite some time before and 
felt that he [Appellant] had become dilatory and 
felt that the only answer was to file a default and 
default judgment. 
Q. Did you ever attempt to contact him either by 
writing or by oral communication to tell him that he 
had better respond or you were going to take default? 
A. No. I had no obligation to .... 
Certainly from the record, it is clear that there was 
an understanding between Appellant and Respondent's attorney, 
that no further action would be taken until the weigh slips 
were obtained. It is clear Appellant exercised good faith 
and attempted to obtain the weigh slips. (see Appellant's 
testimony lines 27 page 11 through line 17 page 13 of trans-
cript) It is undisputed that Appellant was selling his pro-
perty in Utah and moving to Idaho during the interval prior 
to the entry of the default. Appellant exercised his best 
effort. Where such evidence was before the Court, the Court 
erred in not granting Appellant's motion. The facts and 
evidence presented show that a reasonable justification ex-
isted for the Appellant not to act and his actions came clear-
ly within the meaning of Rule 60 (b) (1) and as such, the 
lower court abused its discretion in not setting aside the 
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default .. 
POINT 3: APPELLANT'S MOTION UNDER RULE 60 (b) (1), UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WAS TIMELY .MADE .. 
The trial court made no findings or conclusions in this 
matter to the contrary that Appellant's motion was not timely 
made. It is clear from the record, that Appellant filed his 
motion around three months from the date the judgme.nt was 
entered and clearly within three months from the date Appel-
lant received notice that a default judgment had been filed. 
(See transcript line 18 page 20 through line 12 at page 21) 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in not granting Appellant's 
Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment on two grounds. The 
first ground is that the Court never obtained jurisdiction 
over the Appellant because a person was served who did not 
"reside at Appellant's place of abode" as required by statute. 
Lack of jurisdiction is a question that can be attacked at 
any time. There is overwhelming evidence which established 
that the person served was not living or residing with the 
Appellant at the time of service. Respondent failed to 
produce any evidence to the contrary. For these reasons, 
Appellant's appeal should be granted and the default judg-
ment should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction. 
Secondly, this case deals with the very elements and 
reasons why Rule 60 (b) (1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
established, namely, to allow a person to respond where there 
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has been a "mistake, inadvertance or excusable neglect." 
The ·facts establish beyond~doubt that Appellant believed 
and understood that Respondent's attorney had agreed to 
forego further legal action until weigh tickets, which were 
"fundamental'' to the issue of the lawsuit, could be obtained. 
That Appellant exercised "due diligence" in obtaining them; 
that Appellant was never instructed to perform by a cer-
tain date or contacted subsequent by Respondent's attorney 
to give him notice of Respondent's attorney's intent to 
file a default because Appellant had been "dilatory". If 
this Court finds that there was jurisdiction over the 
Appellant by the lower court, then irregardless, Appellant 
is entitled to have the default judgment vacated and the 
issues between the parties heard on their merits, because of 
the equitable doctrine of excusible neglect. 
Therefore, Appellant respectfully requests that his 
Appeal be granted and the default judgment entered against 
him in the lower court be vacated. 
DATED this 27th day of March, 1980. 
SC~t~ 
Appellant, Douglas K. Freeland 
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